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NOVEL PUBLIC REASONS'
Lawrence B. Solum*
I. INTRODUCTION
One important strand of the debate over the role of religion in
the public square concerns the notion of "public reason"-the
common reason of members of the public in their capacity as citizens
constituting a polity. John Rawls has argued that citizens in a modern
pluralist democracy owe each other a duty of civility in public debate;
meeting this obligation requires each citizen to offer public rea-
sons-reasons that their fellow citizens would not reject as unreason-
able-when engaging in public debate about the constitutional
essentials.' Rawls's view, his liberal ideal of public reason, has been
the subject of considerable interest and discussion.
t © by the Author.
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola
Marymount University. I owe thanks to Sharon Lloyd and John Rawls for their
illuminating comments on a draft. This Essay is dedicated to Jean Hampton and Greg
Kauka, my first teachers in political philosophy. They are greatly missed.
1. Rawls's views about public reason are complex and have evolved over a period of
several years. Several qualifications to the statement in the text will be introduced later
in this Essay. The remainder of this footnote provides references to the work in which
Rawls has developed his views on public reason. I have been unable to locate the phrase
"public reason" in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE]; it does not appear in the index. A very similar idea does appear,
however, in his discussions of "publicity." See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, § 69,
at 454; John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980,
77 J. PHIL. 515, 537 (1980) ("Citizens in a well-ordered society roughly agree on these
beliefs because they can be supported ... by publicly shared methods of inquiry...
familiar from common sense and [including]... the procedures and conclusions of science,
when these are well established and not controversial.").
The idea of public reason was introduced in several of Rawls's essays in the 1980s.
See John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 233, 244 (1989); John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985). Rawls extensively developed the idea in his Melden
Lectures delivered in 1990. John Rawls, The Idea of Free Public Reason, Inaugural
Abraham Melden Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine
(Feb. 27 and Mar. 1, 1990). These lectures were published in revised form in 1993. JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
Rawls has further revised his views since the publication of Political Liberalism; revisions
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This Essay takes up one important and influential objection to a
Rawlsian conception of the ideal of public reason.2 This objection,
made by Jeremy Waldron,3 is premised on the notion that compliance
with the Rawlsian ideal would impoverish political discourse by
banishing novel arguments from the public sphere. Call Waldron's
thesis the novelty objection. This objection is misguided. Although
public political debate would be impoverished if it were confined to
a static set of universally accepted premises and modes of reasoning,
Waldron errs when he charges that a Rawlsian ideal of public reason
would require such sterility. Rather, a sympathetic reading of Rawls
suggests that general acceptance of a liberal ideal of public reason
would permit the robust evolution of political discourse.
My exposition begins with a brief introduction to the public
reason debate. Rawls's ideal of public reason and Waldron's
objection connect to two intersecting clusters of issues. The first
cluster, which is the' focus of this Symposium, concerns the role of
religion in law and politics. The second cluster, which deals with the
fundamental questions of political philosophy, revolves around
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness. In this Essay, my topic is the
role of the novelty objection at the intersection of the two clusters of
issues: the implications of a Rawlsian view of novel public reasons for
debates about religion and politics. My views have been shaped by
the substantial literature concerning the role of religion in the public
are expected in John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations, U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) and in the introduction to the paperback edition of JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed.)] (manuscript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review).
2. Although I believe that the positions that I take here are compatible with Rawls's
current views and with the central premises of his general theory-justice as fairness-the
views that I defend here might be better termed as Rawlsian than as those of Rawls.
Rawls's views continue to evolve, as discussed supra note 1, and there are some
terminological differences between my formulations and those in Rawls's unpublished
work. For my views on other aspects of the public reason debate, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217 (1994) [hereinafter Solum, Inclusive Public
Reason]; Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549
(1994) [hereinafter Solum, Situating PoliticalLiberalism]; Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing
an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993) [hereinafter Solum,
Constructing an Ideal]; Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083
(1990).
3. Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 817 (1993).
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square, including work by Robert Audi,4 Kent Greenawalt,5 Michael
Perry,6 and others.
The idea of public reason has been debated by legal scholars and
philosophers, and Rawls's notion has been deployed as a premise for
argumentation in both legal theory and doctrine.7 The phrase "public
4. See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and
State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
5. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995);
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); KENT
GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987); Kent Greenawalt, Religious
Expression in the Public Square-The Building Blocks for an Intermediate Position, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1411 (1996); Kent Greenawalt, Some Problems With Public Reason in
John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1303 (1995); Kent Greenawalt, On
Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1994) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Public Reason];
Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment. The Status of Personal Experience and
the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647 (1993).
6. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991); Michael J. Perry, Religious
Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1421 (1996) [hereinafter Perry,
Religious Arguments]; Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choke: Further
Thoughts-and Second Thoughts-on LOVE AND .POwER, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703
(1993); Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 599
(1992). Perry's recent views are expressed more fully in MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION
IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming).
7. The brief introduction in text only touches on some of the many issues raised by
the growing literature on Rawls's notion of public reason. Moreover, there is extensive
literature on the role of religion in politics apart from that specifically concerned with
Rawls's notion of public reason. The following sources directly discuss or apply the idea
of public reason. See Catherine Audard, The Idea of "Free Public Reason", 8 RATIO JURIS
15 (1995); Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 273,312 n.224 (1993); James F. Bohman, Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism:
Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict, 23 POL. THEORY 253 (1995); Bruce
W. Brower, The Limits of Public Reason, 91 J. PHIL. 5 (1994); Paul F. Campos, Secular
Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814, 1817-21 (1994); David S. Caudill, Lagan's
Social Psychoanalysis: Religion and Community in a Pluralistic Society, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
125, 137-38 (1995); David S. Caudill, Pluralism and the Quality of Religious Discourse in
Law and Politics, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 145-55 (1994); Peter De Marneffe,
Rawls's Idea of Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 232 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 347,
365 n.67 (1995); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211, 293 (1993); Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 967 n.14 (1993); Leslie Pickering Francis,
Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 65, 78-85
(1993); Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic
Constitution, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 646-58 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and
Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1996); Jean Hampton, How You
Can Be Both a Liberal and a Retributivist: Comments on Legal Moralism and Liberalism
by Jeffrie Murphy, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 105 (1995); Jean Hampton, Retribution and the
Liberal State, 1994 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117 (1994); Jean Hampton, Should Political
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reason" is ambiguous and might be used to express any of a number
of distinct ideas.8 As used in the context of debates over the role of
religion in the public square, "public reason" refers to the common
reason of the public in its capacity as citizens constituting a polity.
Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?, 99 ETHICS 791 (1989); Peter F. Lake,
Liberalism Within the Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawis'
Political Philosophy, its Political Positivism, and the Limits on its Applicability, 19 VT. L.
REV. 603,634-41 (1995); Gary C. Leedes, Rawls's Excessively Secular Political Conception,
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083 (1993); Percy B. Lehning, The Idea of Public Reason: Can It
Fulfill Its Task?, 8 RATIO JURIS 30 (1995); S.A. Lloyd, Situating a Feminist Criticism of
John Rawls's POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319 (1995); Edward J.
McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and
Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 644 n.174 (1993); Linda C. McClain, Rights and
Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12
CONST. COMMENTARY 227 (1995); Chantal Mouffe, Democracy And Pluralism: A Critique
of the Rationalist Approach, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (1995); Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991); Philip
L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, 69 PROC. &
ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASs'N 49 (1995); R. Randall Rainey, Law And Religion: Is
Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 147 (1993); David AJ. Richards,
Liberal Political Culture and the Marginalized Voice: Interpretive Responsibility and the
American Law School, 1955 STAN. L. REV. 28 (1993); David M. Smolin, The Religious
Root and Branch of Anti-Abortion Lawlessness, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 119 (1995); Cass R.
.Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995); Paul J.
Weithman, Taking Rites Seriously, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 272 (1994); Michael P. Zuckert, The
New Rawls and Constitutional Theory: Does It Really Taste That Much Better?, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 227 (1994); Susan K. Houser, Comment, Metaethics and the Overlapping
Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (1993); Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement:
Indeterminacy And Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997 (1994); Rachel
Mariner, Note, Burdens Hard to Bear: A Theology of Civil Rights, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 657, 671 n.75 (1992); Christina Engstrom Martin, Comment, Student-Initiated
Religious Expression After Mergens and Weisman, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1565 (1994); Joshua
Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503 (1994) (reviewing JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable Ethics and
Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1523, 1549 n.80 (1989) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988));
Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994) (reviewing
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) and RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION
(1993)); William Powers, Jr., Constructing Liberal Political Theory, 72 TEx. L. REV. 443
(1993) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) and T.K. SEUNG,
INTUITION AND CONSTRUCTION (1993)); David AJ. Richards, Book Review, 23 GA. L.
REV. 1189 (1989) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
(1987) and KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988)); Michael J. Sandel, Book Review, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (1994) (reviewing JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)); Elizabeth Wolgast, The Demands of Public
Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1936 (1994) (book review).
8. For a brief review of historical uses of the idea of public reason, see Solum,
Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, supra note 2, at 754-62.
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An ideal of public reason is a normative standard for the use of public
reason.
Early on, borrowing a phrase from Kant,9 Rawls introduced what
he then called the "idea of free public reason":
[G]reat values fall under the idea of free public reason, and
are expressed in the guidelines for public inquiry and in the
steps taken to secure that such inquiry is free and public, as
well as informed and reasonable. These values include not
only the appropriate use of the fundamental concepts of
judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of
reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown in the adher-
ence to the criteria and procedures of common sense
knowledge, and to the methods and conclusion of science
when not controversial, as well as respect for the precepts
governing reasonable political discussion."
Although this discussion contains the core of Rawls's position, a few
additional points deserve separate mention.
First, public reason is the reason of a political society, its "way of
formulating its plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority and of
making its decisions accordingly."" Thus, -public reason contrasts
with the "nonpublic reasons of churches and universities and of many
other associations in civil society."' 2 Public and nonpublic reason
share simple rules of inference and evidence, features which are
essential to reason itself." Public reasons, however, are limited to
premises and modes of reasoning that can appeal to the public at
large. Indeed, the criterion for public reason is availability to the
public at large. Rawls argues that these include, but are not
necessarily limited to, "presently accepted general beliefs and forms
9. See Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment', in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (H. Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991)):
The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about
enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very
narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of
enlightenment. But by the public use of one's own reason I mean that use
anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public.
What I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in
a particularly civil post or office with which he is entrusted.
l. at 55.
10. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 233, 244 (1989).
11. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 212.
12. Il at 213.
13. IL at 220.
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of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclu-
sions of science when these are not controversial.
1 4
Nonpublic reasons would include reasons located within the deep
premises of a comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical moral
theory. Consider two examples of nonpublic reasons: first, the
hedonistic utilitarian premise that only pleasures and pains are of
fundamental value; and second, a religious belief that a particular text
is sacred and that its authoritative interpretation by church leaders is
the source of binding moral reasons. Although the utilitarian premise
is secular and the theological premise is religious, both are nonpublic
reasons because neither can be accepted as a reasonable ground for
action by the public at large, which is understood as the body of
citizens who are in full possession of the powers of human reason and
who nevertheless believe in a variety of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines.
Second, Rawls limits his exposition of an ideal of public reason
to a special case. He does not consider whether an ideal of public
reason applies to all actions by the state, or even to all coercive uses
of state power. Rather, he limits his analysis to the case that he
considers clearest-the case of the "constitutional essentials" and
"questions of basic justice."' 5 Thus, the scope of the freedom of
speech and qualifications for the franchise would be subject to the
Rawlsian ideal. But he leaves open the question whether the details
of tax legislation and the regulation of pollution control would also be
covered. 6
14. Id. at 224.
15. Id at 214; see also id § 5, at 227-30 (discussing the idea of constitutional
essentials).
16. Rawls notes that a full account of public reason would need to offer an account
of these subjects and how they differ from the constitutional essentials and questions of
basic justice. Id. at 215. Kent Greenawalt has argued that the distinction between the
constitutional essentials and other subjects for public political debate may be difficult to
draw in practice. See Greenawalt, Public Reason, supra note 5, at 687. I have argued
elsewhere that Greenawalt's interpretation of Rawls's position is not quite right: Rawls
limits himself to the case of the constitutional essentials and the basic structure, and
therefore does not take a position on the application of his ideal to other cases. See
Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 580. Greenawalt's arguments can
therefore be read as making a case for the extension of the Rawlsian ideal to all coercive
use of state power-an argument with which I would be sympathetic. On the other hand,
if Rawls were to conclude that the requirements of public reason are different in cases
other than the constitutional essentials, then he would need to answer Greenawalt's
objection.
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Third, Rawls argues that the duty of civility and hence his ideal
of public reason applies to citizens and public officials when they
engage in political advocacy in a public forum; it also governs the
decisions that officials make and the votes that citizens cast in
elections. The ideal does not, however, apply to what Rawls calls the
background culture; the reason of civil society includes discussion
within a variety of special institutions, such as universities and
churches, as well as dialogue between the adherents of a variety of
comprehensive religious and secular doctrines. Moreover, the ideal
does not apply to personal reflection and deliberation about political
questions. Finally, it does not apply to such reflection or deliberation
about questions that are not political in nature. 7
Fourth, Rawls opts for an inclusive-as opposed to an exclu-
sive-interpretation of the ideal of public reason. Citizens and public
officials do not breach the duty of civility when they offer nonpublic
reasons as the foundations for, or supplements to, public ones.
Although Rawls has been read as advocating a view of public reason
that would exclude religious reasons from public debate, that is not
the best reading of his work as a whole. My interpretation flows from
several considerations that I have explored at length elsewhere.'"
Perhaps the most important evidence for the proposition that a
Rawlsian ideal of public reason is inclusive is that this interpretation
best fits the fundamental justification that Rawls offers for the ideal.
This justification is based on the liberal principle of legitimacy:
"[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and ratio-
nal."19 It is because of this principle that "the ideal of citizenship
imposes.., the duty of civility-to be able to explain to one another
on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they
advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of
17. RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 215.
18. See Solum, Inclusive Public Reason, supra note 2; Solum, Constructing an Ideal,
supra note 2. In the Introduction to RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed.),
supra note 1, Rawls states:
[W]hen engaged in public reasoning may we also include reasons of our
comprehensive doctrines? I now believe.., that reasonable such doctrines may
be introduced in public reason at any time provided that in due course public
reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support.
19. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 217.
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public reason."'  While the duty of civility requires citizens to offer
public reasons, it does not itself require abstention from the disclosure
of nonpublic reasons that play a foundational or supporting role in
either political deliberation or public political debate. Moreover, the
giving of nonpublic reasons, which-while not shared-are the
foundations of public reasons-which are shared-may foster mutual
civility and tolerance. I may see that you and I agree about funda-
mental public values but disagree about the moral foundations of
those values. Despite my unwillingness to accept them as true, I may
nevertheless come to see your fundamental views as reasonable. 1
Fifth, and finally, the obligations imposed by the duty of civility
are obligations of political morality. The ideal of public reason does
not justify legal restrictions on what can be said in public debate; it
does not imply that citizens should be punished when they fail to
include public reasons for their actions. Rather, an ideal of public
reason is an ideal of democratic citizenship.' A good citizen will
recognize a duty of civility, and all citizens have a moral obligation to
comply with it. In addition, citizens may have collateral political
obligations, such as to praise others who comply under difficult
circumstances and to criticize those who fail to meet the duty.
With these features in mind,23 we can offer a summary of a
Rawlsian ideal of public reason; this ideal has five main features:
1. Content of Public Reason: The ideal specifies public
reason as reason which relies on premises and modes of
reason that are available to the public at large, including (a)
the general features of all reason, such as rules of inference
and evidence, and (b) generally shared beliefs, common-
sense reasoning, and the noncontroversial methods of
science.
-2. Scope of Application: As a minimum, the ideal applies
to deliberation and discussion concerning the basic structure
and the constitutional essentials.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 249. Although Rawls acknowledges Seana Shiffrin and myself as the source
of this argument, my first encounter of the argument was in discussion with Sharon Lloyd
following Rawls's Melden Lectures.
22. Id. at 216.
23. Many important points are not included in this summary. For example, a full
statement of the ideal would include an obligation to refrain from intolerant or
disrespectful speech-for example, racial bigotry-in public political debate. See Solum,
Constructing an Ideal, supra note 2, at 752.
NOVEL PUBLIC REASONS
3. Persons Obligated: The duty of civility specified by the
ideal creates obligations (a) for both citizens and public
officials when they engage in public political debate, (b) for
citizens when they vote, and (c) for public officials when
they engage in official action-so long as the debate, vote,
or action concerns the subjects specified in (2).
4. Structure of the Obligation: The ideal requires (a)
citizens and public officials (i) to include public reasons in
public political debate, but (ii) nonpublic reasons may be
included, so long as public reasons are offered in due course,
and (b) in special contexts, such as the decision of a legal
dispute or the passage of a bill, public officials should
exclude nonpublic reasons from official pronouncements
such as judicial opinions or statements of legislative purpose.
5. Nature of the Obligation: The duty of civility implied by
the idea is an obligation of political morality, and the ideal
does not necessarily justify legal restrictions on public
political discourse.
As we have seen, Rawls's ideal of public reason is controversial
for a number of reasons. One strand of the public reason debate has
proceeded from the assumption that a liberal ideal of public reason
would exclude religion from public debate. As I have briefly outlined
above and argued extensively elsewhere, I believe that this assump-
tion is incorrect. Moreover, many of the objections to a liberal ideal
of public reason make the erroneous assumption that such ideals
exclude religious morality from public debate and allow secular moral
beliefs to participate on unequal terms.24 Again, I will put this
problem to the side in this Essay.
II. THE NOVELTY OBJECrION
This Essay focuses on only one objection to a liberal ideal of
public reason: the novelty objection The gist of the novelty
objection is that a Rawlsian ideal of public reason would drain public
political debate of its vitality by excluding novel arguments. As I
shall demonstrate, the best interpretation of Rawls's position is that
novel arguments are not excluded from public political debate except
24. See id. at 741.
25. The novelty objection was first articulated by Jeremy Waldron and then taken up
by Philip Quinn and Michael Perry. See Quinn, supra note 7, at 49; Perry, Religious
Arguments, supra note 6, at 1436-37.
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in very narrow circumstances. In this Part of the Essay, I present an
exposition and reconstruction of Waldron's argument.
A. Waldron's Interpretation of the Rawlsian Ideal of Public Reason
Waldron's statement of the objection is worth quoting at length.
He articulates an interpretation of Rawls that establishes the basic
premise of the objection as follows:
John Rawls offers what, in my opinion, is an overly narrow
conception of the matrix of public reason, suggesting that it
must always proceed from some consensus-"from premises
that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for
the purpose of reaching a working agreement." He suggests
that public deliberation be limited to "the shared methods
of, and the public knowledge available to, common sense,
and the procedures and conclusions of science when these
are not controversial." What this conception seems to rule
out is the novel or disconcerting move in political argumen-
tation: the premise that no one has ever thought of before,
but which, once stated, sounds plausible or interesting.
Rawls' conception seems to assume an inherent limit in the
human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics,
implying as it does that something counts as a legitimate
move in public reasoning only to the extent that it latches
onto existing premises that everybody already shares.
26
Thus, Waldron argues that Rawls's conception of public reason is too
narrow.
What is Waldron getting at? Before I provide a detailed recon-
struction of Waldron's argument, let me state what I take to be
Waldron's core intuition. Waldron believes that Rawls's idea of
public reason would limit public discourse to the least common
denominator, that is, the premises on which we all agreed. But that
would be a nightmare for everyone, even for those whose beliefs were
the most common-sensical. It is as if someone were to propose that
cooking should be governed by an ideal that rules out all the
ingredients to which anyone might object. What would be left?
There would be only a tiny number of ingredients, and hence a diet
without spice or variety. Suppose that the only ingredients allowed
26. Waldron, supra note 3, at 837-38 (citations omitted) (quoting John Rawls, The Idea
of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1987)).
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were sugar, flour, and milk. From these, we could make only a very
few dishes, perhaps a bland pudding. But if we were allowed to use
eggs, we could make a souffle! Some would object to eggs because
of the cholesterol in the yolk. And since we would never get to
experiment with eggs, we would never learn that we could make a
souffl6 by using just the whites. Any real innovation in cooking
would be made impossible, and this would operate to everyone's
disadvantage, even to those who were on very restricted diets.
Waldron imagines that an ideal of public reason might operate
in this way. We would all be fed a bland diet of familiar ideas. And
because we would never be able to experiment with new ideas, all of
us would be harmed, even those of us who would dislike almost any
new idea. If we never experimented with new arguments, we would
never have the opportunity to discover the really good ones-the
novel premises that lead to the discovery of important new truths.
1. Two problems with a Rawlsian ideal of public reason
Now that we have an intuitive sense of the novelty objection, let
us consider the details of Waldron's argument. Why does Waldron
believe that Rawls's conception is too narrow? Waldron considers
this question at two different levels.' The first level concerns the
possibility of public political discourse that is not limited by an ideal
of public reason that excludes premises that are novel or controver-
sial. The second level concerns the fairness of an ideal of public
reason that does not so limit public political discourse.
2. The problem with the alleged impossibility of novel reasons
Consider first Waldron's position with respect to possibility.
Characterizing Rawls's position, Waldron writes:
It suggests that justificatory moves must always connect with
an existent consensus, with the stock of ideas already
"implicit in the political culture" of our society. In fact,
justificatory consensus may be invented in or constituted by
27. For our current purposes, we can suspend any questions about Waldron's
separation of the two levels. At some level, the question of whether citizens can be
persuaded by novel reasons will blur into the question of whether they should be
persuaded. Standards of reason are normative and open to argument; in this sense, the
answer to the question whether public reason can include novel reasons depends, at least
in part, on whether good reasons can be given for whether public reason should include
such reasons.
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a political discourse that does not presuppose or assume its
existence. Moves may be made in political argument that
bear no relation to existing conventions or commonly held
opinions, but which nevertheless gain a foothold as soon as
they are considered and discussed by persons with open
minds.?
At this point, Waldron is not analyzing a normative question. The
issue is not how should we deliberate, but is rather how can we
deliberate. Waldron believes that Rawls's ideal of public reason rests
in part on the notion that public reason "must always proceed from
some consensus."
29
On what grounds does Waldron hold this interpretation of
Rawls? The answer to this question is not entirely clear, for Waldron
does not engage in extensive textual exegesis of Rawls. Rawls states
that to comply with a liberal ideal of public reason as applied to the
constitutional essentials:
[W]e are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and
philosophical doctrines-to what we as individuals or
members of associations see as the whole truth-nor to
elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if
these are in dispute. As far as possible, the knowledge and
ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of
justice and their application to the constitutional essentials
are to rest on plain truths now widely accepted, or available,
to citizens in general. Otherwise, the political conception
would not provide a public basis of justification."
There is evidence here for part of Waldron's interpretation. In
particular, "plain truths now widely accepted" does suggest that public
reason must "proceed from some consensus."31
It is still not clear what Waldron means when he uses the modal
operator "must" in "must always proceed from some consensus." It
is possible that the "must" here is intended in a normative sense.
28. Waldron, supra note 3, at 838 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 837.
30. RAWIS, POLCICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 224-25.
31. On the other hand, this passage does not admit of the more extreme interpreta-
tion, quoted above, where Waldron states that Rawls holds "that something counts as a
legitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it latches onto existing premises
that everybody already shares." Id. at 838. There is a substantial difference between
Rawls's statement, "plain truths now widely accepted" and Waldron's "existing premises
that everybody already shares."
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Waldron might be reading Rawls as saying, "one must argue from
premises that are the subject of consensus in order to comply with the
requirements of political morality expressed in a normative, ideal of
public reason." If this is what Waldron intends, then my two level
reading of Waldron is off the mark, and what I call the level of
possibility collapses into the level of fairness.
There is, however, evidence that Waldron intends "must" to
convey the concept of necessity. For example, Waldron states,
"[m]uch of what Rawls and others say about the exigencies of public
reason is based on concerns about the possibility of public debate."3
On this reading, Rawls believes that it is impossible for public
political debate to go forward unless such debate is limited to
arguments with premises that are already, accepted. One must be very
careful here, for clearly Waldron would not contend that Rawls
believes that nonpublic reasons cannot be uttered in public political
debate. That interpretation is silly. Rather, Waldron's interpretation
would be that Rawls believes that public political debate about the
constitutional essentials cannot serve its purpose or be effective unless
nonpublic reasons are excluded.33
In particular, Waldron seems to be worried that Rawls may
believe that novel reasons would be "incomprehensible" and hence
that reasons which are novel could never persuade. Waldron argues
that such a belief would rely on what Karl Popper calls "the myth of
the framework," 4 a supposed myth based on the Wittgensteinian
thought that "[i]f language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may
sound) in judgments."3
Waldron argues that radical disagreement does not preclude
comprehensibility. The background necessary to get a conversation
going may turn out to be surprisingly "thin.3 6 In his exposition of
this point, Waldron contrasts two different conceptions of public
32. Id at 840 (emphasis omitted).
33. At this point, I am accepting the assumption that Rawls believes nonpublic reasons
must be excluded from public political debate about the constitutional essentials. As I
indicated above, that assumption is incorrect, because Rawls adheres to an inclusive or
wide view of public reason. See supra text accompanying note 18.
34. Waldron, supra note 3, at 835 (citing KARL R. POPPER, OBJECrIVE KNOWLEDGE:
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1972)).
35. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 88e, 242 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1968).
36. Waldron, supra note 3, at 835.
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deliberation, the Aristotelian and the Millian. The Aristotelian
conception, resting on the notion that the collective deliberation of all
citizens may be better than the individual deliberation of the most
excellent individual citizen, 7 requires each contribution to political
discourse "be made in a way that is ... apt to be received by other
members of the community."' 8 Thus, the Aristotelian conception
implies limitations similar to those expressed by Rawls's notion of a
duty of civility. The Millian conception, analogous to the metaphor
of the marketplace of ideas,39 postulates public discourse that is not
constrained by civility, but is instead conducted in an arena in which,
"people simply fling their views and opinions into the public forum of
ideas,"4 or as Mill puts it, "the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners."'"
What is the point of Waldron's discussion of the two conceptions
of public deliberation? The point is not to endorse Mill's conception:
Waldron thinks the Aristotelian conception is superior.42 Rather,
Mill's conception is invoked to suggest that political deliberation is
possible, even when argument is not civil. Millian public deliberation
may not be civil, but it is also not impossible.
Waldron argues that public debate can do its work so long as the
arguments that are used are "likely to have an effect on the existing
consensus." 43  Waldron's central idea here is quite important.
Waldron argues that the path to a new consensus may go through
37. Waldron quotes the following passage from The Politics:
There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of
a good quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may
surpass-collectively and as a body, although not individually-the ability of the
few best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one
man's expense. In the same way, when there are many [who contribute to the
process of deliberation], each can bring his share of goodness and moral
prudence; and when all meet together the people may thus become something
in the nature of a single person who-as he has many feet, many hands, and
many senses--may also have many of the qualities of character and intelligence.
ld. at 835-36 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 123, bk. III, ch. 11, *1281b (E. Barker
trans., 1946)).
38. lea at 836.
39. See id. at 836-37 & n.65; cf Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative
Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54, 68-
72 (1988-1989) (providing exposition of marketplace of ideas metaphor).
40. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 836.
41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956).
42. Waldron, supra note 3, at 837.
43. Id. at 838.
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political arguments that are novel or that are currently the subject of
strong disagreement:
In fact, justificatory consensus may be invented in or
constituted by a political discourse that does not presuppose
or assume its existence. Moves may be made in political
argument that bear no relation to existing conventions or
commonly held opinions, but which nevertheless gain a
foothold as soon as they are considered and discussed by
persons with open minds.'
3. The problem with the alleged unfairness of novel reasons
Recall that Waldron's contention is that a Rawlsian conception
of public reason is too narrow. In this section, I explicate Waldron's
contention that Rawls believes that the inclusion of novel reasons in
public discourse would be unfair.
As understood by Waldron, Rawls's fairness argument relies on
the notion that it would be unfair for adherents of one comprehensive
view-religious or secular-to use the power of the state to impose a
policy supported only by their view on those who do not share it: this
would involve, "a privileged place for the views of some over
others."4 Waldron then argues:
Instead of saying positively that we must be sure that a
reason is part of an existing consensus before we can appeal
to it, we may phrase the doctrine as a narrower, negative
claim. We must not appeal to considerations which we
know, or have good reason to believe, are not shared in the
society. Religious considerations fall into this category, for
it is common knowledge in our society that no agreement
may reasonably be expected on matters of religion.'
Even when narrowed in this way, Waldron argues, the require-
ment of a Rawlsian ideal of public reason would be unnecessarily
strict. Religious reasons are not usually given as the sole or sufficient
justification for government action; rather, they are put forward as
part of a larger dialogue or discussion: "A contribution may be put
forward as something for one's fellow citizens to ponder and consider
along with the other views that they are listening to, something for
44. ILI
45. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 213.
46. Waldron, supra note 3, at 840"(emphasis omitted).
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them to take into account. What they make of it may be left up to
them."
47
Thus, the first step in Waldron's critique of the fairness argument
is to argue that the strict limits imposed by the Waldron interpretation
of Rawls's ideal of public reason are unnecessary: fairness can be
achieved with a more inclusive ideal. Novel reasons can be included
in public discourse, at least if one of two conditions is met. First, the
novel reason should not be of the kind with respect to which we know
no agreement may reasonably be expected, or second, the novel
reason is offered as part of a background discussion and not as a
proposal to use public power to forcibly impose something on
everyone else.4'
The second step in Waldron's critique proceeds differently.
Waldron argues that the inclusion of novel reasons in public debate
is not unfair, because such reasons should be viewed as a good by
those to whom they are given. This argument has two strands. The
first strand concerns the quality of public deliberations; the inclusion
of novel reasons will make for better deliberations:
[W]e think it part of the point of public deliberation to
expose citizens and other decision makers to perspectives
and experiences with which they are initially unfamiliar.
Only on the basis of such exposure is there any reason to
believe.., that the decision which results at the end of the
deliberations will be any improvement over the prejudices
with which the people went into the forum. Only on this
basis can we expect the participants in dialogue themselves
to be improved by the exposure.49
Presumably, better .deliberations result in better decisions, and hence
in benefits to those who are members of the polity that is deliberat-
ing.
The second strand concerns the benefit to the individuals who
participate in deliberations in which novel reasons are included. Put
the other way round, the argument is that citizens would be harmed
intellectually if they were denied access to novel reasons:
[I]t is important for people to be acquainted with the views
that others hold. Even more important, however, is the
47. Id. at 841.
48. Id.
49. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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possibility that my own view may be improved, in its
subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphys-
ics that I am initially inclined to reject.... I mean to draw
attention to an experience we all have had at one time or
another, of having argued with someone whose world view
was quite at odds with our own, and of having come away
thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of it,
but, still, it makes you think ... ." The prospect of losing
that sort of effect in public discourse is, frankly, frighten-
ing-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced
by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness"
or "reasonableness" (or worse still, "balance") consists of
bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted
without question on all sides. That is to imagine open-ended
public debate reduced to the formal trivia of American
television networks50
Thus, the giving of novel reasons in public political debate should not
be seen as unfair, because such reasons are actually of benefit to
those who are exposed to them. There is a missing step to Waldron's
argument. It is possible that reliance on novel arguments is unfair,
even though novel arguments are beneficial to those who find them
unreasonable."' With this last point in place, we can now summarize
the novelty objection.
C. A Reconstruction of the Novelty Objection
Waldron's argument might be reconstructed as follows:
1. Rawls's ideal of public reason counts a reason as public
if and only if that reason is (a) itself an existing premise that
everybody already shares, or (b) it follows from an argument
that has only existing premises that everybody already shares
as premises. Assumption.
2. A reason is a conclusion if it is asserted to follow from a
premise and a valid method of reasoning; a reason is a
premise if it does not so follow. Definition.
50. Id. at 841-42.
51. Frequently, a restriction on autonomy will be justified on the ground that there is
a benefit to the person whose autonomy is restricted. The fact of benefit is not sufficient
to establish that the denial of autonomy is fair. If I force you to pursue a career against
your wishes, I have treated you unfairly, even if it turns out that my preference produced
a greater benefit to you than my respect for your self-determination would have produced.
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3. Rawls's ideal of public reason excludes premises from
public political debate unless the premises are public
reasons. Assumption.
4. A premise is novel relative to a political culture if the
premise has not been introduced in public deliberation
before and almost all the members of the culture have not
considered the premise before. Definition.
5. A novel premise is not a public reason. From 1, 2, and
4.
6. Rawls's ideal of public reason excludes novel premises
from public debate. From 3 and 5.
7. There are novel premises that once stated are plausible
or interesting. Assumption.
8. The inclusion of plausible or interesting novel premises
in public debate is desirable, (a) because inclusion of novel
premises will improve the quality and hence the outcome of
public deliberations, and (b) because the inclusion of novel
premises will be of benefit to those who are exposed to
them. Assumption.
9. Rawls's ideal of public reason will have the undesirable
consequence of excluding novel reasons from public political
debate. From 6, 7, and 8.
III. EVALUATING THE NOVELTY OBJECTION
With this statement of the novelty objection in place, we are now
in a position to evaluate it. I will develop five replies to the objec-
tion. First, I point out that the novelty objection confuses availability
with universal acceptance. Second, I demonstrate that the novelty
objection confuses universal agreement with wide agreement among
reasonable persons. Third, the objection fails to explain why novel
conclusions cannot suffice to fulfill the need for novelty in the public
debate. Fourth, I argue the novelty objection incorrectly assumes the
exclusive view of public reason. Fifth, and finally, I contend that the
case for a Rawlsian ideal of public reason does not rest on the so-
called "myth of the framework."
A. The Novelty Objection Fails to Distinguish
Availability from Acceptance
The first and most fundamental problem with Waldron's
statement of Rawls's position is that Waldron misunderstands the
criteria for public reasons. Waldron assumes that for a reason to be
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public in Rawls's sense, it must be accepted by the public at large.
Recall, however, that what Rawls said was a bit different; Rawls
referred to reasons "now widely accepted, or available, to citizens in
general." A reason may be available to the public, even if it is not
yet accepted by the public. Indeed, there is no reason for the
inclusive or wide ideal of public reason to exclude a novel argument
if the argument is one that could be widely accepted if it were
considered by the public at large-in other words, if it were publicly
available. The liberal principle of legitimacy states that the exercise
of political power is justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance
with constitutional essentials that all citizens may reasonably be
expected to endorse in light of principles and. ideals acceptable to
them as reasonable and rational. Although Rawls may occasionally
have stated his ideal of public reason in terms of preexisting agree-
ment among citizens about the premises of political argument, there
is nothing in his underlying arguments that requires this restriction.
Once this misconception is cleared away, Waldron's objection
loses most of its force. The criterion for public reason is not universal
prior acceptance. Rather, public reasons are those that could be
widely shared by those who considered them, and these can be as
novel as one likes. No prior conditions to the admissibility of an idea
into public reason attach, except those which are directly attendant to
whether the reason is available. Prior acceptance is one route to
availability, but it is not the only route. For example, a reason can be
available to a given citizen because it fits with the citizen's other
beliefs. Another route of availability would be deductive; a reason is
available to a citizen if that reason follows from the citizens other
beliefs. A reason may be available if it is intuitively plausible and
does not contradict any of the citizen's other firmly held beliefs. A
reason might be available, because it can be accommodated by natural
expansions or extensions of the citizens current system of belief
Even a reason that contradicts current beliefs might be available if
minor adjustments would render the whole system of belief more
attractive with addition of the novel reason. This list of possibilities
is just the beginning, for we can surely imagine a host of other
mechanisms by which a novel reason could become available.
B. The Novelty Objection Confuses Universal Agreement with
Wide Agreement Among Reasonable Persons
There is a second difficulty with step one. There is surely at least
one citizen who disagrees with almost every possible premise of public
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political argument. If public reason required universal agreement on
premises, then public political debate would be impossible.52 The
principle of charity in interpretation suggests that we ought to look
for an interpretation of Rawls's views that does not render those
views nonsensical. Moreover, the text of Political Liberalism, Rawls's
most complete published statement on public reason, does not easily
support this interpretation. Rawls's own statement of what is allowed
by public reason-"plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to
citizens in general"-suggests that "an existing premise that would, if
considered, be widely accepted" would be more accurate than "an
existing premise that everybody already shares."
Even an exclusive ideal of public reason-for example, one that
excluded all nonpublic reason from public political debate-would
allow for premises that are not already shared. To take an obvious
example, an exclusionary principle of public reason would allow
factual premises that are accessible to common sense or ordinary
science, even though these are not "premises that everybody already
shares." Moreover, when it comes to matters of political morality,
there are many values that, while not the subject of universal
agreement, are nonetheless widely shared.
A final point should be made with respect to this second reply to
the novelty objection. The second reply combines with the first.
Rawls need not limit public reasons to those which are widely
accepted now. With respect to Waldron's category of novel premises,
the proper question is whether the novel premise, if given due
consideration, could be widely shared, that is, whether it is widely
available. Neither universal acceptance nor universal availability is
required.
C. The Novelty Objection Fails to Explain Why
Novel Conclusions Cannot Suffice
At this point, I take up steps one and eight in my reconstructed
version of the novelty objection. Recall my statement of these steps.
Step one:
1. Rawls's ideal of public reason counts a reason as public
if and only if that reason is (a) itself an existing premise that
everybody already shares, or (b) it follows from an argument
52. See Solum, Constructing an Ideal, supra note 2, at 743-44.
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that has only existing premises that everybody already shares
as premises. Assumption.
And step eight:
8. The inclusion of plausible or interesting novel premises
in public debate is desirable, (a) because inclusion of novel
premises will improve the quality and hence the outcome of
public deliberations, and (b) because the inclusion of novel
premises will be of benefit to those who are exposed to
them. Assumption.
If step one were to end at the conclusion of subpart (a), the resulting
interpretation of Rawls results in a rather implausible version of a
liberal ideal of public reason. Presumably, there is no need for public
deliberation if everyone already agrees on everything. Subpart (b)
allows novel conclusions to count as public reasons if they are
supported by universally shared premises. 'We have already estab-
lished that "universally shared" is too strong-and "widely available"
is a more accurate statement of Rawls's position-but at this point I
focus on another issue. Thus, the contrast will be between public
reasons, whatever those are on the best Rawlsian account, and novel
reasons.
The inclusion of subpart (b) provides one mechanism for the
introduction of novel arguments into public political debate. No
violation of the principle of exclusion specified in step one would
occur if a citizen used shared political values and factual arguments
supported by common sense or ordinary science to argue for a new
principle of political morality. I take it that something like this has
occurred over the course of the last century or so with respect to the
right to privacy, a principle of political morality that is, at least in
some sense, new.
At this point, I think that it is important to notice an assumption
that is implicit in Waldron's use of the term "premise." He has
implicitly adopted a deductive model of argumentation. The notion
is that there are premises and conclusions, and that a sharp distinction
can be drawn between them. Of course, we may take something as
a premise in one context and as a conclusion in another. Propositions
that can be supported by good and sufficient reasons may be assumed
for the purpose of argument. But there are at least some premises
that are not supported by reasons. Novel premises may be like this;
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recall that Waldron posits a "premise that no one has ever thought of
before, but which, once stated, sounds plausible.
53
But of course, there are other models of political argument. In
this connection, recall Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium:
In searching for the most favored description of this situa-
tion we work from both ends. We begin by describing it so
that it represents generally shared and preferably weak
conditions. We then see if these conditions are strong
enough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, we
look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and
these principles match our considered convictions of justice,
then so far well and good. But presumably there will be
discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We can either
modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise
our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take
provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision. By going
back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our
judgments and conforming them to principal, I assume that
eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation
that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields princi-
ples which match our considered judgments duly pruned and
adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilib-
rium.
54
Thus, a reason could well be the "conclusion" of an argument from
public reasons using the method of reflective equilibrium, even if the
reason was not the conclusion of a deductive argument with public
reasons as its only premises. The category of novel premises should
be limited to those novel reasons which "no one has ever thought of
before, but which, once stated, sound[] plausible or interesting,""5
and which cannot be supported by an argument using the method of
reflective equilibrium, where existing public reasons are brought into
reflective equilibrium with the novel reason. The question that
Waldron must answer is whether the novelty objection has much
force, once the category is narrowed in this way. Recall that step
eight of the reconstructed argument assumes that novel premises add
53. Waldron, supra note 3, at 838.
54. RAWLS, THEORY OF JusTICE, supra note 1, at 20; see RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 8.
55. Waldron, supra note 3, at 838.
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great value to political deliberation, but it is not clear that novel
conclusions will not do the job.
Thus, the third problem with the novelty objection is that it
applies only to a subset of novel political arguments-those that
cannot themselves be supported by considerations of public rea-
son-and that it is at least an open question whether this category is
sufficiently substantial to underwrite the novelty objection.
D. The Novelty Objection Incorrectly Assumes the
Exclusive View of Public Reason
The force of Waldron's objection, as applied to Rawls's view, is
further blunted by the fact that Waldron assumes a Rawlsian ideal of
public reason must be exclusive, that is, it must exclude all nonpublic
reasons, when the best Rawlsian view is an inclusive or wide view.
This assumption is stated at step three in our reconstruction of
Waldron's argument:
3. Rawls's ideal of public reason excludes premises from
public political debate unless the premises are public
reasons. Assumption.
Step three expresses an inaccurate interpretation of Rawls's position.
The better interpretation is that Rawls adheres to an inclusive or wide
view of public reason.
The arguments for my interpretation of Rawls on this point are
referred to above. 6 The wide or inclusive ideal of public reason
only excludes nonpublic reasons in those cases in which the provi-
so-that in due course participants in public political debate support
the political measures they propose in terms of the principles and
values of a public political conception of justice-is not met. One can
imagine that novel political arguments would be introduced in cases
in which the proviso was satisfied, that over time these novel
arguments would become part of the public political culture, and thus,
that eventually, the novel arguments would become public reasons.
There may remain a category of cases in which a novel political
argument which could not itself be supported by public reasons would
violate the proviso, because the novel argument is only relevant in
contexts in which the public-reason-in-due-course proviso could not
56. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. Rawls now affirms what I call the
"inclusive view." See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 248; Rawls, The
Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations, supra note 1.
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be met. Even in these cases, the nonpublic reason could be intro-
duced outside of public political debate, in the background culture.
Thus, the novel argument might first be introduced in academic
discourse or even in an opinion piece in a newspaper or journal of
public circulation, so long as the author did not advance the argument
as an already sufficient reason for political action. Again, one can
imagine a process by which such novel arguments came, over time, to
be viewed as public reasons.
Once this final qualification is in place, it is not clear whether
Waldron's argument has any force. Although Waldron is surely right
to be terrified by the prospect of a culture where the only arguments
we hear are those with which we already agree,' 7 general adherence
to Rawls's wide ideal of public reason would not produce such a
sterile landscape.
E. The Case for a Rawlsian Ideal of Public Reason Does
Not Rest on "The Myth of the Framework"
At this point, my answer to the novelty argument is essentially
complete. There is one final point that needs to be addressed. Recall
that Waldron argues that the notion that public reason must exclude
novel arguments rests on the so-called "myth of the framework,"
supposedly, the Wittgensteinian view that agreement in judgments is
necessary for communication to take place. Is Rawls committed to
such a view? It is true that there are strongly Wittgensteinian
elements in Rawls's work. Consider the following passage in Rawls's
discussion of political constructivism, a topic that is to the side of the
issues we have addressed so far:
I do not say that there being an objective order of political
reasons consists in various activities of sound reasoning, or
in the shared practice thereof, or in its success. Rather, the
success of the shared practice among those reasonable and
rational is what warrants our saying that there is an order of
reasons. The idea is that if we can learn to use and apply
the concepts of judgment and inference, and ground and
evidence, as well as the principles and standards that single
out the kind of facts to count as reasons of political justice;
and if we find that by reasoning in the light of these mutual-
ly recognized criteria we can reach agreement in judgment;
57. Waldron, supra note 3, at 842.
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or if not agreement, that we can in any case narrow our
differences sufficiently to secure what strikes us as just or
fair, honorable or decent, relations between us; then all this
supports the conviction that there are objective reasons."8
Rawls continues by stating that being able to state sufficient
reasons for judgment "is already the best possible explanation of the
beliefs of those who are reasonable and rational. At least for political
purposes, there is no need to go beyond it to a better one, or behind
it to a deeper one."5 9 The insistence that there is no need for deep
explanations is characteristically Wittgensteinian, and this is confirmed
in the footnote to the previous quotation, in which Rawls says, "We
cannot ground these principles and canons on something outside
reason. Its concepts of judgment and inference, and the rest, are
irreducible. With these concepts explanations come to and end; one
of philosophy's tasks is to quiet our distress at this thought."'  The
parallel to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is unmistakable;
as Wittgenstein says, "Explanations come to an end somewhere.",
61
This Wittgensteinian idea is connected with the passage quoted by
Waldron. The fact that we agree in judgments is connected to the
fact that explanations must come to an end: explanations can end
precisely because we do agree in judgments.
Two points need to be made here. First, Rawls has attempted to
construct his political theory so that it is not dependent on any
particular views in metaphysics, epistemology, or the philosophy of
language. Rawls may be a Wittgensteinian, but justice as fairness is
not per se a Wittgensteinian theory.62
Second, even if we assume that a Wittgensteinian thesis about
agreements in judgments is deeply entrenched in Rawls's theory, it is
not clear that this thesis is in any way inconsistent with the inclusion
of startling or novel premises in public political debate.
Indeed, the Wittgensteinian thesis might offer an account of how
novel premises can be included in public political debate. It may be
that not all of our agreement in judgments is captured by the
58. RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 119-20.
59. I. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. at 121 n.26.
61. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 34, § 1.
62. The ideal of public reason itself would preclude Rawls from relying on
Wittgensteinian theories about the philosophy of language. Justice as fairness, of which
the ideal of public reason is a part, must be a freestanding view that can be affirmed by
the public as a whole, and not only those who subscribe to particular philosophical views.
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arguments that we have already made. A novel reason may express
a shared judgment. Moreover, our judgments are corrigible-they can
change in response, for example, to perspective altering events: the
Civil War, the Holocaust, the Oklahoma City bombing. A novel
reason may express a newly found agreement in judgments. There is
nothing in the best Rawlsian ideal of public reason that precludes
citizens from advancing novel reasons expressing changing agreements
in judgments, so long as those judgments could be widely shared
by-or available to-their fellow citizens.
IV. CONCLUSION
The novelty objection fails, at least if its purpose is to show that
the best Rawlsian ideal of public reason is inadequate. There are
several different ways in which a Rawlsian ideal of public reason can
allow the expression of novel reasons. The conclusions that we have
developed so far, can be restated as follows:
1. The use of novel premises in public political debate does
not violate the ideal, even if they are not universally
accepted by the public at large, so long as they are widely
available-that is, they would not be rejected as unreason-
able by substantial numbers of reasonable citizens. Because
wide availability is the criterion for public reason, only novel
premises that are unavailable count as nonpublic reasons.
2. The use of novel conclusions in public political debate
does not violate the ideal, and the range of novel reasons
that can be seen as conclusions is quite broad, once it is
understood that deduction can be supplemented by the
method of reflective equilibrium.
3. The introduction of nonpublic novel premises in public
political argument is allowed by the inclusive or wide view
of public reason, so long as the nonpublic novel premise is
used in a supporting or supplementary role and the public
reason is given in due course.
4. Nonpublic novel premises may be introduced in the
background culture, and if such premises gain acceptance
there, they may then be introduced into public political
debate.
At this point, the burden is on the proponent of the novelty objection
to show that there is a significant class of novel reasons that would
not be allowed into public debate in one of these four ways. Rawl's
NOVEL PUBLIC REASONS
own most recent statement on public reason makes it clear that he
does not conceive of public reason as static or unchanging:
It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one
political conception of justice, certainly not by justice as
fairness alone. Rather, its content-the principles, ideals,
and standards that may be appealed to-are those of a
family of reasonable. political conceptions of justice and this
family changes over time. These political conceptions are
not for course compatible and they may be revised as a
result of their debates with one another. Social changes
over generations also give rise to new groups with different
political problems. Views raising new questions related to
ethnicity, gender, and race are obvious examples, and the
political conceptions from these will debate the current
conceptions. The content of public reason is not fixed, any
more than it is defined by any one reasonable political
conception.6 3
Rawl's statement of his position reinforces the arguments that have
already been adduced in support of an inclusive or wide interpretation
of his position. Waldron is wrong to believe that novel reasons
cannot be public ones.
This is not to say that there is nothing to be learned from the
objection. Confronting the objection requires the clarification of a
liberal ideal of public reason. In particular, answering the objection
illuminates the ways in which public reason can change over time. At
any given time, a wide variety of novel arguments would be allowed
by an inclusive ideal of public reason. Public reason will evolve in
response to novel arguments, new knowledge, changing circumstances,
and shifts in our shared judgments. The novelty objection does not
give us grounds to reject the best Rawlsian ideal of public reason.
We can be civil to one another and at the same time say something
new.
63. RAWLS, POLICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed.), supra note 1, page proofs at -li.
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